Otto von Bismarck and the Birth of Germany
In the aftermath of the dramatic collapse of the Holy Roman Empire
during the Napoleonic Wars of the early nineteenth century,
the political landscape of Central Europe underwent a profound transformation.
The territories that had composed the once-mighty empire eventually evolved
into a diverse coalition of thirty-nine
German-speaking kingdoms, free cities, and other states known collectively
as the German Confederation.
Although there was significant interest in the concept of forming a German nation,
fragmentation and discord within this new alliance meant
that achieving a cohesive state remained elusive for many decades.
In the 1860s, however, the shrewd statesman Otto von Bismarck
became the prime minister of Prussia, a German kingdom
that competed with Austria for dominance in the German Confederation.
During his early days in politics, the conservative Bismarck had held deep-seated
apprehensions
that unification would lead to the demise of Prussia’s identity,
and he had thus accepted Austria’s prevailing supremacy within the German
Confederation.
With the passage of time, though, Bismarck came to consider Prussia’s deference
to Austria humiliating and feared his nation would lose its standing within the region.
He eventually became the leading advocate of unification,
embracing a vision of a new German state dominated by Prussia.
Bismarck was a practitioner of what is known as realpolitik,
a pragmatic approach to diplomacy and statecraft that focuses on strategic
objectives
and national interest at the expense of ideological and ethical considerations.
Bismarck repeatedly demonstrated his mastery of realpolitik in his efforts to achieve
his political objectives.
First, upon taking power, Bismarck found himself in conflict with the liberal
majority
in the lower house of Prussia’s legislature over issues related to the
nation’s military budget.
He soon realized, however, that a diplomatic dispute with Denmark had potential
as both a distraction from the budget issue and a means to advance
the cause of German unification.
At the time, Denmark was attempting to incorporate a section of Schleswig-Holstein,
a member of the German Confederation, into its territory.
Though even the Prussian monarch admitted
that his nation had no legitimate claims on Schleswig-Holstein,
Bismarck saw an opportunity to exploit outrage regarding Denmark’s actions
among members of the German
Confederation, and he launched a successful military campaign
that wrested control of it from Denmark, expanding both Prussian territory
and influence.
Two years later, Bismarck again utilized realpolitik, isolating rival Austria diplomatically
to allow Prussia to go to war with it without bringing powers
like France and Russia into the conflict.
This second Prussian triumph allowed Prussia to annex more territory
and relegated Austria to the status of a second-rate state
that was so focused on internal issues that it was no longer a threat.
In the wake of the conflict, the North German Confederation,
a relatively unified collection of twenty-two states, was formed,
with Prussia playing a dominant role.
Both these actions served to increase popular support for the formation of a German state
and undermine liberal opposition to Prussia’s military expansion.
While the North German Confederation was an important step toward unification,
it could not become a reality without the southern German states,
which were hesitant to enter into a political union.
Bismarck, however, realized
that the southern German states’ treaties specifying military cooperation
with Prussia could be manipulated to overcome their reluctance.
Therefore, he utilized realpolitik again, resorting to purposely inflaming
tensions
with France, the common enemy of the German states.
He did so by crafting a diplomatic incident, selectively modifying key phrases
and omitting context in an important diplomatic telegram,
deliberately provoking outrage in France, all the while insisting
that he was doing his utmost to avoid conflict.
The telegram caused the French emperor Napoleon III to initiate hostilities with Prussia,
proving once again Bismarck’s aptitude for diplomatic manipulation.
The southern German states came to the aid of Prussia’s North German Confederation,
and France was soundly vanquished.
The combination of Bismarck’s superb political maneuvering
and the three armed conflicts that had brought
unity to the once-fragmented German-speaking territories
finally resulted in German unification in 1871.
The ceremony, however, took place at the Palace of Versailles, near Paris,
rather than in Berlin, which had been the capital of Prussia.
According to historian Katja Hoyer, formalizing the unification within
the borders
of any German state would have fomented envy and resentment among the others.
Furthermore, she argues that the choice to hold it in the nation
that it had just defeated reflected the fact that military struggle had
been
at the core of Germany’s formation.
This led to a situation where,
she writes, “the maintenance of national unity required a diet of conflict.”
Historians like Hoyer argue that Bismarck’s utilization of armed conflict
to cement German unification set a precedent for future German politics,
embedding a reliance on military prowess and strategic maneuvering
as key elements of German identity that would have tragic consequences
when they contributed to the outbreak of World War I some forty years later. |
英語検定 １級(2025年第1回No.4)